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INTRODUCTION
LAWRENCE R. VELVEL

HIS SYMPOSIUM

comes at a propitious time for an examination

As all must know, until well into
of federal-state relations.
the twentieth century the role of the federal government was
far less significant in internal affairs than it is today. But the events
of the New Deal and after worked a great change in our system: from
the "hundred days" of Franklin Roosevelt until our own time, the
federal establishment has basically been the focal point of efforts to
obtain social, economic and racial change in this country.
Today, however, there is a movement afoot to alter the trend of
the last forty years by shifting more power and responsibility to the
states. In the political and economic sphere, this movement has at
least two interrelated causes. One has been the war in Indo China.
Not only did the war create vast dissatisfaction with the foreign
and military policies of the federal government, but it also spawned
a more generalized dissatisfaction with many aspects of American
life. Serious and bitter criticism was leveled at the federal establishment, at federal politicians, at traditional ideologies and at traditional life styles. The general atmosphere was ripe for the view
that there should be less power in Washington.
A second source of the movement to shift authority to the
states in the political and economic sphere has been the surprisingly intractable nature of so many of the serious domestic problems
faced by the nation. Problems such as housing and welfare, for
example, have thus far proved unamenable to solution. They have
confounded the efforts of social planners who believe that solutions
can be achieved by relying on Washington.
The movement to shift authority away from the federal establishment also has a judicial sphere. In this sphere it is argued
that the federal courts should be curbed in general or should have
their authority diminished vis-a-vis their state counterparts in par-
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ticular. There are some legitimate bases for such arguments, but
I am afraid that too much of the primary impetus does not stem
from the serious considerations of concerned judges and lawyers
who are honestly debating the wisdom of extending the federal
rights of the citizen. Rather, a great share of the impetus comes
from politicians and other persons whom I call the "law and order
hypocrites." Preying upon the fears of the average citizen, the
"law and order hypocrites" call for cracking down on lawbreakers.
But when it suits their own political purposes, they are in the forefront of those who cause or condone breaches of the law. Election
frauds, graft, municipal corruption, failure to prosecute friendly tax
evaders, illegal uses of force against citizens, illegal uses of force
abroad-all these things and more are in the arsenal of politicians
who most stridently call for law and order and who consequently
spearhead the movement to diminish the authority of the federal
judiciary and the rights of the citizen.
The present Symposium deals with the political, economic and
the judicial spheres of the movement to shift power from the federal
establishment to the states. Subjects like revenue sharing, federal
incorporation and the viability of state governments pertain to the
political and economic spheres. They contain within them subissues
of such grand sweep that they are perennial on the American
stage. Are the state governments closer to the citizen and more
responsive to him than the far-off federal bureaucracy? Are state
and local governments organized in a way which makes them capable of providing a modern, efficient government? Will more
money make the state and local governments more viable? Are
the states, the federal government or its independent agencies dominated by vested interests? Are the states destructive of the rights
and entitlements of ordinary citizens and minority groups, whereas
the federal government is more solicitous toward such persons? Are
the states truly laboratories for experiments in human progress, or
would they be if they had more money? When one considers
some of the subissues which can arise in discussions of subjects
treated in this Symposium, it becomes clear that these discussions
conjoin the novel and the traditional. In the modernistic garb of
revenue sharing and federal incorporation are clothed the ancient
concerns of the body politic.
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While reading the arguments pro and con in the Symposium,
one may begin to feel some uneasiness about another ancient American concern-the quest for competence. In economic matters, this
quest has been expressed by seeking efficient production. In political terms, the quest has been expressed by seeking "good government."
The institutional systems which are used to produce
goods, to run governments, to deliver services, to give education,
and to do just about any other job one can think of, are supposed
to be designed to encourage and liberate competent performance.
In discussing revenue sharing or other devices for shifting power
and responsibility to the states, the arguments in this Symposium
are basicially talking about changes in the institutional systems toward
government competence. The goal of the desired changes is, of
course, to make possible a better governmental performance in regard to domestic problems. Yet, as I read the pros and cons, it
seemed to me that there probably is no clearly right or clearly wrong
answer as to which institutional changes would be most productive
of better governmental performance. It further struck me as being
at least arguable that all across the spectrum of American life a
most fundamental problem today is not so much that systems are
intrinsically deficient, but that large numbers of people are nor performing their jobs competently. Be it in politics and government,
in the labor force, in the educational establishment or in any one
of a number of other areas, one is constantly confronted by an
inadequate quality of work, sometimes coupled with a relatively
uncaring attitude. If it is true that a lack of competent effort
has become a most basic problem, or perhaps the most basic problem, then I am afraid we shall have to address ourselves to more
than revenue sharing to cure the ills of the nation. Determining
the root causes and solutions for a broad absence of competent
performance is bound to involve difficulties which make the complexities of revenue sharing seem trivial by comparison.
In the judicial sphere, the Symposium treats the traditional subjects of habeas corpus and abstention, which affect the degree to
which the federal judiciary will protect the citizen. The arguments
on these topics speak for themselves, and I would attempt but one
or two embellishments. Ideas which curtail the federal judiciary's
ability to protect the rights of the citizen have had a significant
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history in this century. But an all too prevalent judicial failure to
protect citizens is precisely what has caused a large diminution in
respect for the courts among minorities, the young, and other segments of society. It is my judgment that the courts would do better to expand and protect the rights of the citizen than to curtail
those rights. Certainly the courts would be doing better from the
moral standpoint; and since the young of today are already numerous and will be the mass of citizens tomorrow, the courts will
ultimately do better from the pragmatic standpoint as well. And if
the protection and expansion of rights causes howls from state
judges or even Presidents, then so be it. The rights of citizens
should be safeguarded from the mob by the federal judiciary even
when the mob is led by state judges or the President of the United
States.
Finally, I would note that the subject of preemption, which is
treated here by Harrop Freeman, bridges the two spheres of the
movement to shift power to the states: it bridges the economic
and political sphere on the one hand and the judicial sphere on
the other. The doctrine of preemption is relevant to judicial determinations on the question of what organs of government have the
political authority to protect the citizen from the dangers which reside in the modem economy and modem technology. If the federal standards for permissible radiation emissions are thought by
a state to be dangerously low, is the state preempted from setting
higher standards? Is a state preempted from regulating the safety
of products which are sold nationally but which the state regards
as harmful? When the federal government is violating its own
statutes or Constitution, can the state sue to enforce those documents, or is its right to do so preempted in effect by the notion
that only the federal government is parens patriae where federal
laws or the federal Constitution is involved? Are the states preempted from stopping the pollution of interstate waterways by interstate businesses?
The abuses of modem technology and the modem economy are
usually perpetrated by interstate organizations, and curtailing these
abuses will consequently have interstate effects of one kind or another. Thus, the easy answer for courts to give on the premption problem is often that the power of cure resides solely in the
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national government. This is particularly easy when the national
government has already addressed itself to the problem in some
way. But, knowing what we do know of the inadequacies in Washington, the easy answer may not always be the safe one from the
standpoint of health and welfare.
The real challenge is for the courts to work out a set of coherent
legal doctrines which have the effect of insuring that the citizen
obtains adequate protection against technological and economic
abuse. Such doctrines would have to be flexible enough to permit protection to be given by the political branches of the federal
government when they are doing a better job than the states, and
to be given by the states when they are doing a better job than the political branches of the federal government. At the same time, the doctrines would have to be sufficiently principled so that decisions
would not be rendered on a totally ad hoc basis. Lastly, the complete set of doctrines would have to provide for judicial protection
in cases where neither the states nor the political branches of the
federal government are protecting the citizen: in such cases the
judicial protection would have to be based on some sort of evolving common law.
In concluding this Introduction, I would reiterate that this Symposium comes at an opportune time. The days ahead will see much
political and legal discussion of the topics treated in the Symposium, and may see much social and legal change along lines
which it broaches. The Symposium, then, is a contribution to
evolving fields of thought and action.

